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The Elusive Promise ofIndigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy. By
Karen Engle. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. Pp. xiii, 424. Price:
$24.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Giselle Barcia.
"Development policies that take into account indigenous peoples' culture
and identity can be beneficial not only to indigenous peoples, but also for
Member States, and developing countries in particular."' In 2010, the U.N.
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Development made that loaded assertion in a
news statement. Indeed, the "special theme" of last year's Forum was
"Development with Culture and Identity" and, at the Forum's opening, U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared: "Diversity is strength-in cultures
and in languages, just as it is in ecosystems."2
Indigenous rights and self-determination for indigenous groups has long
been a topic of advocacy on the world stage, and culture has often served as the
connective thread between the two. Yet, as the Tenth Session of the U.N.
Forum approaches in May, a question persists: why has success in this area
remained notably limited? In The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development:
Rights, Culture, Strategy, Karen Engle tackles that question and offers a
provocative answer. Throughout the book she identifies the legal strategies that
indigenous activists use in international law to advocate for rights and, in turn,
evaluates the advantages and drawbacks of those strategies. Elusive Promise is
firmly rooted in the rich literature about indigenous self-determination,' but
Engle's central thesis is unique. She argues that the idea of culture, which
emerged as the primary mode of legal advocacy in the pan-indigenous
movement, has in fact minimized the movement's success. The two clashing
forces of a right to culture and a right to self-determination, Engle contends,
result in the eponymous "elusive promise" of development.
Engle acknowledges that the culture argument has often resulted in
progressive jurisprudence for indigenous groups. She studies the Inter-
American Court and cites several examples of property and land ownership
claims brought under a right to culture (p. 127-32). Yet those successful cases
contain an "invisible asterisk" (p. 133). Engle argues that the resulting
I. Press Release, Econ. and Soc. Council, Impact of Development Policies on Indigenous
Culture, Identity Focus as United Nations Permanent Forum Meets at Headquarters 19-30 April, U.N.
Press Release HR/5011 (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.un.orgfNews/Press/docs/2010/
hr50 I.doc.htm.
2. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Sec'y-Gen.. , Remarks at the Opening of the Ninth Session of the UN
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/
sgstats.asp?nid-4497.
3. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A
Territorial Approach, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Thomas M. Franck, Indigenous Peoples: An
Emerging Object ofInternational Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1989).
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outcomes do not provide sufficient autonomy in politics, economics, or
property. With Elusive Promise, then, Engle makes a significant contribution to
indigenous rights advocacy not by simply rejecting a culture-based strategy, but
by revealing its underbelly: though on its face progressive, a culture strategy
has actually produced very limited rights, and those rights sometimes bring
with them adverse effects.
In order to challenge the widely held assumption that indigenous
development advocates should rely on a right-to-culture strategy, Engle traces
the role of culture in the history of international and transnational indigenous
rights movements. Turning first to the origins of that strategy, she begins her
narrative with colonialism, comparing the English and Spanish modes of
conquest and explaining why indigenous movements have tended not to rely on
a human rights legal argument. Engle makes the compelling point that in post-
colonial Latin America indigenous advocates "had long been skeptical of
human rights," a concept "inseparable from the civilizing mission of colonial
days or the globalizing or liberalizing mission of neocolonialism" (p. 43).
Rather than setting the stage for self-determination, human rights instead
threatened indigenous culture.
Engle's impressive historical account of the indigenous movements
elegantly presents the countervailing strategies available to indigenous rights
advocates. She traces the rise of the right-to-culture strategy amidst a strained
history of colonialism, the emergence of the pan-indigenous movement, and,
finally, the more recent quest for legal self-determination. Completing that
historical account, Engle turns to the clash itself between human rights and the
right-to-culture strategy in indigenous rights advocacy, highlighting the
constraints on a culture strategy. Engle examines culture in three primary
modes, each of which, she maintains, carries a limiting factor in its use as
strategy for indigenous development: "The first, culture as heritage, threatens to
alienate indigenous peoples from their heritage; the second, culture as land,
makes indigenous land inalienable; and the third, culture as development,
combines with the second to limit the forms of development available to
indigenous people" (p. 7).
Engle's examination of "Human Rights and the Uses of Culture in
Indigenous Rights Advocacy," is the most compelling of the three parts of
Elusive Promise, wherein Engle explores the shifting notions of what culture
can mean and how it can limit the results of indigenous development. Here,
Engle asks difficult questions to test her thesis: "What does the World Bank
mean . . . when it says it has agreed to 'mainstream' ethnodevelopment in a
particular policy or project? What role do indigenous heritage and land play in
such mainstreaming?" (p. 208). "To secure land tenure," she posits and then
examines the somewhat questionable results. "What if indigenous groups want
to engage in development activities that have nothing to do with traditional
cultures?" Engle asks. "Or, to put it another way, if indigenous groups are
entitled to autonomy, why should anyone outside the group have a say over
how they choose to develop? . . . [W]hat or who is the subject of protection in
indigenous rights advocacy[?] Is it the culture, the people, or the peoples?" (p.
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2 10-11). Engle cites specific examples on both sides, where certain special
protections seem to arise from tradition and where attempts at development
seem divorced from tradition. Regardless, problems in the distribution of power
and resources persist.
The last section of Elusive Promise presents an unexpected case study:
the case of Afro-Colombians. At first, it seems odd for Engle to choose a non-
indigenous case study to end the book. Yet the analysis serves as a way to
expand Engle's theory, and it benefits from Engle's extensive on-site research.
In a recent interview, Engle stated that she chose to end the book with the Afro-
Colombian case study "in part to consider how rights based on identity become
so important to social movements or groups that might not otherwise have
opportunities for land use or ownership or development.'" Tracing the
consequences of the complex Law 70, which gave unprecedented protection to
the Afro-Colombian community, Engle argues that the limiting effects of
structuring a rights movement around culture are not exclusive to the context of
indigenous development.
The report on the Ninth Session of the Forum states that "the violation of
[indigenous peoples'] human rights affirmed in the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples-specifically, the right to self-
determination and the right to development with culture and identity based on
indigenous world views-has caused them to experience many critical socio-
economic problems."5 That statement exemplifies the view that Engle is
attempting to complicate in her work: that the right to culture is not a sound
framework on which to construct a strategy for indigenous development. She
argues that "the framing of cases around cultural identity often displaces or
defers issues of economic inequality and even of structural racism," which
clearly limits the positive effects of an advocacy effort.6
Yet, in Elusive Promise, Engle's task runs deeper than that already
important insight: she challenges not only the idea of a static understanding
cultural identity, but also the notion of a static strategy in indigenous legal
advocacy. She seeks to demonstrate the "unpredictability of strategy-the
inability of social movements ever to know that they are on the right long-term
path-and the dangers of insisting that there is only one proper path" (p. 274).
Engle further emphasizes that point in an interview: "[I]f social movements get
too attached to a particular strategy, they lose the possibility for
4. An Interview with Karen Engle on Her New Book on Indigenous Rights and International
Law, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture Strategy, U. TEX. L. MAG. (Oct.
12, 2010), http://www.utexas.edu/law/magazine/2010/10/12/engle-releases-new-book-on-indigenous-
rights-and-international-law [hereinafter An Interview with Karen Engle].
5. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Rep. on the Ninth Session, Apr. 19-30, 2010, T
91, U.N. Doc. E/2010/43-E/C.19/2010/15 (May 19, 2010).
6. An Interview with Karen Engle, supra note 4.
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experimentation, for imagining new legal relationships."7
The central question of Elusive Promise is whether "the indigenous
promise of development ultimately require[s] the abandonment of the assertion
of cultural identity" (p. 213). Engle argues that indigenous rights advocates
should abandon essentialized cultural conceptions and move toward "a more
nuanced (and more 'real') understanding of culture" (p. 277). That attenuated
understanding, combined with a measure of strategic creativity, may yield more
productive results for indigenous self-determination. With this impressive and
truly interdisciplinary approach to international law, historians, anthropologists,
and lawyers alike can appreciate Engle's account of indigenous rights advocacy
and move toward a more complex strategy that successfully integrates culture.
The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict. By
John Quigley. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp.
xix, 326. Price: $27.99 (Paperback). Reviewed by Samir Deger-Sen.
For over sixty years, Palestine's legal status has been an ambiguous and
contested issue. Traditional conceptions of statehood place central importance
on fixed territorial boundaries, capacity for internal self-government, and
reciprocal recognition by other states. On this view, Palestine's statehood is
conditional on Israeli acquiescence-Palestine will become a state through a
negotiated settlement with Israel that confers upon it the power to govern
within fixed and secure borders. Not so, says John Quigley, professor of
international law at Ohio State University and frequent writer on the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Quigley argues instead that Palestine is already a state under
international law and has been a state since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
Quigley deftly weaves historical and legal analysis into a compelling,
persuasive account of Palestinian statehood. As Quigley points out, statehood is
often conflated with self-government or defined borders, but it can and does
exist in the absence of both. Indeed, recognition of statehood, far from being
the consequence of territorial control, is perhaps a precondition for it. With
statehood comes the power to speak at international fora, the presumptive right
to self-determination, and access to international organizations, all of which are
crucial if the Palestinian people are to be able to negotiate a fair and final
settlement on political autonomy and the limits of their territory. Quigley's
work therefore is a timely, valuable, and novel contribution to what is already a
voluminous literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Quigley begins his inquiry in 1919 at the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
After over four hundred years of Ottoman rule, Palestine was designated a
Class A mandate within the League of Nations system, and was to be "guided"
toward full independence. Britain withdrew from Palestine in 1948 under the
terms of the U.N. partition plan defined in U.N. Resolution 181. However,
Britain made no effort to enforce the partition plan, and the subsequent Arab-




and the new state of Israel. Some argue, therefore, that Palestine has never
existed as a state-it was under Ottoman control at the inception of the state
system, British control from 1919 to 1948, and Israeli control since 1948.
Palestinian people have lived permanently under the sovereignty of other
states-Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. Quigley cites Knox v. Palestine
Liberation Organization8 for the idea that "it would be anomalous indeed to
hold that a state may achieve independence and statehood . . . [during the]
occupation of a separate sovereign" (p. 221).
Quigley explains, however, that "under Ottoman administration in
Palestine, central governance was weak, leaving the people in the main under
their own local rule" (p. 10). The treaties that transferred legal authority over
Palestine from the dissolved Ottoman Empire to Britain conceived of Palestine
as an "independent nation" (p. 10). Article 22(4) of the League Covenant also
considered the mandates as states. Indeed, the basic legitimacy of the mandate
system depended on the non-annexation principle. Within this context, Britain
allowed self-government for the Palestinian people and the continuous
operation of Palestinian private law during the mandatory period. Quigley
draws on an impressive array of sources from the inter-war period to show that
Palestine was implicitly considered a state under international law by both
Britain and the international community as a whole.
Quigley then turns his attention to showing that the creation of Israel in
1948 did not prejudice Palestine's basic claim to statehood. Quigley points out
that the U.N. partition plan conceived of two separate states within the territory
of Palestine, that "the 1949 armistice agreements explicitly stated that the lines
they drew were not international borders" (p. 123), and that no state recognized
that Palestinian statehood was voided by the creation of Israel. Indeed, "[E]ven
after admitting Israel as a member, the United Nations continued to refer to
Palestine using terminology that reflected its statehood" (p. 115). Since 1948,
Palestine has, to varying degrees, exercised many of the rights of an
independent state, which include engaging in international negotiations, issuing
internationally recognized passports, and implementing and enforcing private
law. Moreover, although no state other than Palestine lays claim to the territory
in the West Bank and Gaza strip, no one would claim that such territory is terra
nullius-as Quigley points out, not since the birth of state system has there
been territory that is not controlled by a state and yet not terra nullius (p. 77).
Moreover, Palestine's statehood has been affirmed by its status in the United
Nations as a member in all but name, and by the recognition granted to
Palestine by over one hundred other states. To be sure, Palestine is a state with
disputed borders (like India, Pakistan, and Israel itself), and a state under
belligerent occupancy (like Kuwait during Iraqi occupancy in 1990, or France
during German occupancy between 1940 and 1945), but it is a state
nonetheless.
After engaging in this historical analysis, Quigley turns his attention to a
theoretical question: what criteria must an entity meet in order to be considered
8. 306 F.Supp.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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a state? Quigley analyzes many commonly articulated standards, such as a
permanent population, defined territorial boundaries, internal self-government,
and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Quigley problematizes
these conceptions of statehood: some states are microstates with tiny permanent
populations and no citizens, such as Niue and the Cook Islands; some are in
deep, intractable border disputes, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea; some are failed
states, without meaningful capacity for internal self-government, such as the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia; some make international
agreements only with the consent of another state, such as Palau and the
Marshall Islands. Moreover, universal recognition is not required as a
precondition for statehood-after all, Israel itself was admitted to the U.N. with
only thirty-seven out of fifty-eight states voting for its inclusion. Quigley never
attempts to give us a more precise definition of statehood, but he suggests that,
even by restrictive definitions, Palestine constitutes a state. Many readers may
be uncomfortable with Quigley's reluctance to provide either a positive or
normative definition of statehood. Nevertheless, Quigley's underlying point is
that Palestine has more true features of statehood than many states that have
been universally recognized.
Quigley's thesis is compelling, and his prose clear and elegant. He has
mastery over a rich and diverse set of historical materials, and he carefully
rebuts all major objections to his argument. His ventures into history never
become sidetracked by the complex political dynamics of his subject matter,
but remain instead tightly focused on the legal arguments he so persuasively
makes. Even those who strongly oppose Palestinian statehood as a normative
matter will be forced to think very deeply about the legal conclusions Quigley
is able to draw from his careful legal research.
If there is a problem with Quigley's thesis, it is that he equivocates on the
crucial question of where this Palestinian state is. Why is Palestine's inherent,
unbroken right to statehood limited to Gaza and the West Bank? Why is it not a
claim to all of mandatory Palestine? Or, at least, defined by the 1948 partition
plan, which was the last legal instrument created by an actor with undisputed
lawmaking power in Palestine? Quigley is never clear on this point. Accepting
the legality of Israel's borders implies that Israel's military expansion in 1948
was enough to transform some of the pre-existing Palestinian state into an
Israeli state. Here, Quigley is caught in a dilemma. If Israel's military
expansion in 1948 was enough to annex some of the Palestinian state, then why
is Israel's military expansion in 1967 not sufficient to convert the rest of it into
Israeli territory? If, on the other hand, military expansion cannot confer
statehood, then why did Israel's actions in 1948 permit the legal constitution of
the Israeli state? Quigley gives very different legal status to the military
expansions of 1948 and 1967, but does not articulate why. If we are to give
them equivalent legal status, we must either reach the conclusion that
Palestinian statehood implies a right to territory that is now almost universally
recognized to be Israeli, or conclude that Palestinian statehood has been
extinguished by military annexation and is now at the mercy of Israel-Palestine
negotiations.
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As fascinating as Quigley's analysis is, it pulls us in these two polar,
politically unpalatable directions. Quigley wants to make his legal analysis
consistent with the most politically expedient solution-establishing a
Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. Unfortunately, they simply do not
square. To counter this problem, Quigley places much stock in the fact that
"Israel has made no claim of sovereignty in Gaza and the West Bank" (p. 221).
However, this vests far too much legal authority in Israel's rhetorical posture
toward the occupied territories. As a theoretical matter, Israel's claim to
territory cannot by itself carry legal effect-if Palestine is a state, then a mere
claim by another state cannot abridge its statehood. Indeed, this is the very
notion that Quigley is arguing against-that Palestinian statehood is somehow
contingent on whether Israel claims sovereignty over the occupied territories.
By attempting to limit the implications of his legal claims, Quigley
inadvertently undercuts his central argument. Quigley recognizes that a legal
conclusion that requires Israel to cede much of the territory acquired in 1948
would never garner political support. Yet, unfortunately a resolution that would
garner political support simply does not follow from his legal analysis.
Nevertheless, Quigley's richly textured analysis is an extremely valuable
contribution to the legal literature on Palestinian statehood. As Quigley himself
points out, recognition of Palestine as a state has been a fiercely contested
element of Arab-Israeli negotiations. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242,
passed after the 1967 war and seen by many as the basis for negotiations over
the last forty years, famously contains no reference to Palestinian statehood,
only "a just settlement of the refugee problem."9 It is this asymmetric
recognition of statehood that contributes to Palestinian feelings of
marginalization and isolation, and it is valuable, therefore, to see Quigley's
fine-grained legal analysis of the subject. Many have argued that recognition of
Palestine is fair, just, and pragmatic, but Quigley's point is that it is legally
mandatory. In an area that inspires such fierce passion on both sides, and where
historical and normative claims are so deeply contested, it is refreshing to see
Quigley's largely dispassionate analysis and moderate tone.
The Statehood of Palestine is highly recommended for anyone wishing to
better understand the legal issues surrounding Palestinian statehood. While it is
easy for states to use the complexity and intensity of the Palestine question as
an excuse to avoid the issue altogether, Quigley reminds us that international
law is for us all to enforce. Palestine can only be a state if the world stands up
and recognizes it as one. The WHO and UNESCO have postponed their votes
on Palestinian recognition multiple times (p. 170). The U.N. General Assembly
has granted Palestine every privilege of statehood aside from formal
membership (p. 141). Western European governments interact with Palestine
on a daily basis, but do not yet call it a state (p. 179-81). If Quigley is right
about Palestine's legal status, then what is one to make of this reticence? What
is law if no one has the courage to enforce it? This is the question Quigley
raises, which the international community must answer.
9. S.C. Res. 242, pmbl., U.N. SCOR, 22d Year, U.N. Doc S/Res/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
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Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal's
Impact in a Postwar State. By Lara J. Nettelfield. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii, 333. Price: $90.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Sue Guan.
When the United Nations announced that it planned to close the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by 2014,
women who had lost their husbands, sons, and brothers in the 1995 Srebenica
massacre gathered in Sarajevo to protest the decision. Standing in the rain, they
carried signs saying, "We are the families of the killed and the disappeared.
Because of us the Tribunal was founded. Don't close it. Don't obstruct it. Let it
dispense justice and truth" (p. 1). In Courting Democracy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal's Impact in a Postwar State, Lara J.
Nettelfield, Simon Fraser University political science professor, attempts to tell
these protesters' stories in order to show how the ICTY has succeeded in
addressing the human rights violations committed during the Yugoslav Wars of
the early 1990s.
The history often told of the ICTY is one of unmet expectations: critics
scholarly and lay have denounced the length of the court's trials, the arbitrary
nature of its legal procedures, and the alleged bias against ethnic Serbs in the
court's choice of indictments. Nettelfield, on the other hand, asks for more
modest-and more forgiving-expectations of the ICTY. Unlike "insiders"
who author "tell-all" books about the failures of the ICTY or scholars who find
the ICTY lacking when compared to abstract ideals of international justice,
Nettelfield bases her evaluation of the ICTY on field research conducted while
she lived in Bosnia for four years between 1998 and 2008, setting the stage for
a more realistic and honest evaluation of the ICTY.
Using her study of the ICTY's impact in Bosnia to springboard her
discussion of international courts in "transitional justice" (a term of art
referring to the approach a state takes to deal with past human rights
violations), Nettelfield takes a longer view than scholars critical of the ICTY
have taken in the past. In compiling her evaluation of the ICTY, Nettelfield
conducts interviews of court officials, politicians, journalists, and members of
the military; surveys civil rights groups, engages in archival and oral history
work; and traces the changes in local attitudes regarding the ICTY. Nettelfield
praises what she calls the ICTY's "expressivist" achievements: the justice and
human rights norms it has helped legitimize, the messages it sends about legal
and moral accountability for war crimes, and the internalization of these norms
by Bosnian citizens over time.
Of course, the ICTY has had its problems, and Nettelfield acknowledges
them. For starters, the unwieldy Dayton Agreement creating the ICTY
generated an institution so bureaucratic that practical tasks, such as transferring
defendants to court, stonewalled. During the court's early years, the court's
indictment choices lacked transparency, and alleged war criminals remained
politically active. Ethnic divides remained, while financial support for refugees
returning to their homes waned over time.
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Despite these drawbacks, Nettelfield makes a strong case for the ICTY's
longer-term benefits. The grieving women who protested the announcement of
the ICTY's planned closing provide one vivid example: they wanted the ICTY
to remain open because they thought it had not yet fully dispensed justice, a
goal meaningful only because those women had internalized the norms around
justice and human rights that the ICTY stood for. As another example,
memorial services held in Poto6ari for victims of the Srebenica massacre drew
crowds of more than twenty thousand. And in 2000, the Mothers of Srebrenica
and Podrinje (a group of women who lost loved ones in the wars) filed a
criminal complaint demanding that the ICTY investigate officials allegedly
involved. Nettelfield cites this as evidence of ordinary citizens' growing sense
of justice and entitlement to the protections of the rule of law. And she credits
the ICTY's legitimization of victims' rights as the cause.
The ICTY has also fostered concrete changes in the infrastructure
available in Bosnia to further transitional justice. Thanks to the ICTY outreach
program, local populations can now learn about the court's decisions via
conferences, websites, and local activists. In 2005, the ICTY spun off the
Bosnian War Crimes Chambers, a state court in Bosnia that is tasked with
trying cases referred to it by the ICTY. This and other local courts will continue
to prosecute war criminals after the ICTY closes shop. Nettelfield marshals
examples that provide powerful evidence for her argument that contrary to the
criticism, the ICTY has been a force for good in post-conflict Bosnia.
Nettelfield's larger point is not merely that the ICTY was a success in
Bosnia, but that instruments of transitional justice more generally-whether
international tribunals or truth commissions-are forces for good in helping
post-conflict societies transition to democracy. This is a difficult argument to
make-are all post-conflict societies just like Bosnia? Would all states' citizens
react in the same way? Who is to say that other governments would be willing
to provide the infrastructure for trials and commissions? Nettelfield doesn't
provide the answers. And in order to do so, Nettelfield would have to engage in
a much broader examination of transitional justice across multiple post-conflict
societies than she has. Without a link between the case in Bosnia and
elsewhere, Nettelfield's arguments for transitional justice being helpful to
democratization feel like afterthought; these arguments appear only in the
introduction and the conclusions of each chapter and of the book. Moreover,
they distract from the power of Nettelfield's case-specific argument for the
ICTY's benefits in Bosnia.
This is not the only instance where Nettelfield would have been better off
in limiting her argument. While in Bosnia, Nettelfield surveyed and
interviewed locals, civil rights groups, and members of the military as part of
what she calls "attitudinal" research, a term from the disciplines of "legal
anthropology" and "law and society." Yet although "attitudinal" is a term that
may carry cache among political scientists, it does little to illuminate research
that can substantively stand on its own. For instance, the survey she gave to
members of the military consists of eighty-nine questions that ask respondents
to rate their views of various international organizations set up to deal with war
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crimes (pp. 297-304). The results? Generally positive. But does the impact
benefit from being called "attitudinal"? Not necessarily.
As an addition to her concrete evidence of local criminal trials, the
increased rhetoric among locals of accountability and justice, and the ICTY's
facilitation of civil rights groups' mobilization in lobbying for everything from
legislative change to financial redress, Nettlefield's surveys certainly add force
to the argument. But framing them in terms of "legal anthropology" and "law
and society," which Nettelfield doesn't satisfactorily define, diminishes the
evidence's punch. Nettelfield claims that these disciplines, compared to more
"positivist" (something she also neglects to define) studies, more accurately
measure the "expressivist" achievements of the ICTY. It seems that the real
point should be that traditional studies of the ICTY should take locals' attitudes
into account because they are important, not because they are integral to law
and society research.
To that point, Nettelfield's book has a simple, powerful thrust, but
couching it in jargon and overbroad claims to consequence only serves to limit
her audience-an unfortunate consequence for a book that finds its niche in
reaching out to locals. But despite these drawbacks, Nettelfield's focus on local
populations in Bosnia is refreshing, and it is key to an evaluation of any
international court's impact in a post-conflict society. International legal
scholars often neglect local voices, something Nettelfield does well to address.
She is leading the way for other scholars. While victims' and locals' increased
sense of justice will not silence all critics of the ICTY, it gives powerful sway
to Nettelfield's argument: the ICTY has furthered transitional justice, at least in
Bosnia. She does a service by showing us how to look at the right evidence,
and fairly.
Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and
the State Department Legal Adviser. By Michael P. Scharf & Paul R.
Williams. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 305.
Price: $30.99 (Paperback). Reviewed by Charanya Krishnaswami.
The unprecedented firestorm of publicity surrounding the 2009
nomination of Harold Koh to the position of Legal Adviser to the State
Department captured headlines and airwaves. Koh, a zealous supporter of
international norms who had criticized the Bush administration for its
ignorance of international conventions,10 proved a highly controversial
nominee. Critics painted a picture of a future in which Koh's "radical
transnationalism" would compromise national security prerogatives," while
supporters of Koh applauded his advocacy of the moral force of international
law.12 For the first time, the Office of the Legal Adviser, which had enjoyed a
10. Eric Lichtblau, After Attacks, Supporters Rally Around Choice for Top Administration Job,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A19.
11. See Ed Whelan, Harold Koh's Constitutional Game, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.nationalreview.corncorner/180413/harold-kohs-constitutional-game/ed-whelan.
12. See Ronan Farrow, Confirm Harold Koh, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/
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low profile in the American public consciousness, was catapulted into the
spotlight.
Not only did the debate surrounding Koh's nomination speak to the
growing prominence of international law-and the diverse opinions regarding
its legitimacy-in the collective American consciousness, but it also
highlighted the difficult questions that Legal Advisers have had to grapple with
in each successive presidency and in each successive war. The title of Michael
P. Scharf and Paul R. Williams' book, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of
Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State Department Legal Adviser,
foreshadows the most important of these questions. Does international law
shape foreign policy, or is it the law that is molded to fit policy objectives?
Rather than addressing this question normatively, Scharf and Williams, who
worked as attorney-advisers in the office during the Bush I and Clinton
administrations, seek to understand the relationship between foreign policy and
international law in practice. To do so, they undertook a groundbreaking
project to canvass and convene the ten living legal advisers from the Carter to
Bush II administrations with the goal of creating the first comprehensive
descriptive account of American public international law as told by those who
practiced at the forefront of the field.
Scharf and Williams's book begins by providing the reader with a quick
primer on the extensive normative debate about a state's obligation to comply
with international law. Scharf and Williams survey the various rationales for
state compliance with international law, both historical and modem, and find
that "constructivism"-a theory arguing that international law shapes national
identity such that compliance inheres in a government's bureaucratic identity-
has been the prevailing rationale for adherence to international law.
Next, the book offers a brief summary of the history and function of the
Office of the Legal Adviser, which was not officially created until 1931. The
authors liken the Office of the Legal Adviser, known colloquially and rather
inscrutably as "L", to the Office of the Solicitor General. Just as the Solicitor
General represents the government in front of the Supreme Court, the Legal
Adviser's office represents the United States in hearings before international
tribunals and in all international claims made against the U.S. government. The
Legal Adviser's office also plays another, broader role: it analyzes the legal
implications of foreign policy decisions and provides advice to the Secretary of
State.
However, in spite of these important functions, the Legal Adviser's office
remained somewhat pigeonholed until the Kennedy-era tenure of Abram
Chayes, who involved the office in an expansive array of substantive issues and
helped the Legal Adviser's office achieve the prominence it enjoys today.
Chayes also implemented competitive hiring practices at L, fostering its
reputation as an elite public international law firm (p. 16). The elitism of L is
further evinced by the descriptions of former Legal Advisers of their ascent to
2009/04/28/state-department-sharia-law-opinions-contributors-harold-koh.htrl; Dahlia Lithwick, And
Then They Camefor Koh . . ., SLATE (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2215142/.
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the position, which reveals nothing so much as the extraordinarily privileged,
homogenous backgrounds of the vast majority of these high-ranking
government officials-three of whom worked at the same sterling New York
law firm before being appointed Legal Adviser (p. 149).
Although brief, these earlier sections provide a useful set-up to the next
section of the book-the ten first-person recollections of the living Legal
Advisers, dovetailed by a roundtable discussion at the American Society of
International Law with all of the advisers. Each of the recollections is loosely
structured around three significant foreign policy issues, the Legal Adviser's
reaction to each, and what he perceived to be the influence of international law
in addressing these crises.
While the accounts detail a diverse array of policy decisions and
implications, there are common threads throughout. For example, Herbert
Hansell, Legal Adviser in the Carter Administration, mentions at the outset of
his interview the legal implications of recognizing "one China" while
attempting to sustain diplomatic relations with Taiwan-a problem the
government continues to grapple with today. Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser
under the Reagan and Bush I administrations, discusses the government's
struggles with Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi, whose government is once
again at the center of controversy regarding use of force. And nearly every
former Legal Adviser describes manifestations of the growing specter of
terrorism, from plane hijackings to embassy bombings to, finally, the cataclysm
of September 11.
It is against the backdrop of these crises that the role of the Legal Adviser
becomes especially important. As Sofaer notes, "[P]erhaps the most important
advice a Legal Adviser can be called on to give is whether a proposed use of
force is lawful" (p. 82). From the preemptive invasions of Grenada and
Nicaragua under the Reagan administration to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
Legal Adviser's office has been responsible for examining the legal
justifications for uses of force and ensuring that they comport with the dictates
of international law. The Legal Adviser's involvement can begin either before
or after the use of force takes place; Davis Robinson, Legal Adviser during the
Reagan Administration, who furnishes a particularly colorful recollection of a
colorful tenure, describes the difference as assisting in the "takeoff' in policy
versus "an after-the-fact containment of a train wreck" (p. 60).
However, as Robinson goes on to note, the United States "has gone from
contending with one large elephant to dealing with about one thousand snakes"
(p. 55). The nature of the foreign policy beast has fundamentally changed. The
Cold War and the threat of the Soviet Union have been replaced with a
nebulous, multi-fronted "War on Terror." As the foreign policy landscape has
changed, Legal Advisers have had to adapt their application and interpretation
of developed legal norms, a task Conrad Harper, Legal Adviser during the
Clinton Administration, likens to "smuggl[ing] into old jars new wine" (p.
161).
When L is called on to give advice regarding the lawful use of force or to
fit legal norms to new policy challenges, the advisers paint a picture of a
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collaborative and cohesive policymaking process. Unfortunately, however,
what the oral histories more often reveal-and what Scharf and Williams seem
to overlook in their optimistic conclusion regarding L's potent ability to uphold
and enforce international law-is a picture of L being entirely shut out of
foreign policy decisionmaking, an office scrambling in the aftermath of a
international debacle for post-hoc justifications.
Sofaer, for example, describes how the Legal Adviser's office was
blindsided by the Iran-Contra Affair, in which the Reagan administration was
caught exchanging weapons for hostages. He notes that the scheme "violated
both the letter and spirit" of the Reagan Administration's own policies (p. 80)
and states that L had no involvement in the planning or execution of the
program.
Similarly, Robinson details the difference between the Reagan
administration's invasions of Grenada and Nicaragua, both in the name of
combating the spread of Communism. In Grenada, Robinson recounts the Legal
Adviser's involvement in every step of the policy planning process. By
contrast, in Nicaragua, the Legal Adviser had no notice of the invasion, and
when a "supposedly covert" intelligence operation became "open and
notorious," it prompted a "hailstorm of international criticism" that ultimately
led to an adverse holding by the International Court of Justice (p. 60).
From more recent history, William Howard Taft IV, who served as the
Legal Adviser during the first half of the Bush II administration, describes how
the administration shut out the Legal Adviser's office from extensive internal
deliberations regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the
Convention Against Torture to Guantanamo detainees. Taft notes that his office
believed, and advised the Secretary, that international treaties did apply to the
detainees. Afterward, the Legal Adviser was excluded from conversations
between the Attorney General and Office of Legal Counsel on the
Convention's applications to detainees: "[We] were not invited to review this
work and we were, indeed, unaware that it was being done .... I think we were
excluded because it was suspected . . . that we would not agree with some of
the conclusions other lawyers in the Administration expected us to reach" (p.
130).
Each of these examples suggests a disillusioning fact about L: that it is
not consulted when it most should be-that is, when a proposed use of force is
most clearly in violation of international law. This seems to undercut L's role
as what Legal Advisers ranging from Davis Robinson to Harold Koh have
likened to the "moral conscience of American foreign policy" (p. 206). Yet just
as a human conscience can be ignored, so can L fall victim to an attitude of
inter armas silent leges on the part of policymakers. As a result, L's real ability
to shape foreign policy is questionable, and perverse incentives are created
whereby L is only consulted when it is willing to tell the government what it
wants to hear.
The book ultimately casts into doubt whether, given that L is so often
shut out of the policymaking process when it expresses-or is most likely to
express-dissent, L is really able to serve as a "moral conscience" on
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international law. In a roundtable discussion that convened the foreign
counterparts to the Legal Adviser, Scharf asked each adviser who they
perceived to be their client. Is it the job of the Legal Adviser to fit the facts to
the law, to encourage the most favorable interpretations of international law,
even to find loopholes allowing the government to sidestep the law altogether?
Or does a Legal Adviser ultimately have a higher obligation to international
law writ large?
While nearly every Legal Adviser noted that there is such a compelling
moral obligation superseding mere policy objectives, the U.K. counterpart
perhaps had the truest and most practical descriptive account: "[T]he Legal
Adviser must advise one's client with a particular knowledge of that client's
needs and objectives, thus advising one's client on a sympathetic and
knowledgeable basis." (p. 174). Perhaps no one could speak more to this fact
than Harold Koh himself, who recently justified the government's use of
predator drone strikesl3-which one U.N. expert has deemed a species of
"extrajudicial killings" in violation of international law.14 Koh has noted his
own shift in tone from academic to bureaucratic and attributed it to the
difference between the "'ivory tower' and Foggy Bottom: "[T]he making of
foreign policy is infinitely harder than it looks.... In this maze of bureaucratic
politics, there is only so much that any one person can do."15
Although Scharf and Williams conclude the book with a rose-colored
vision of the government's adherence to L's advice and L's corollary ability to
mold foreign policy to the dictates of international law, the advisers'
recollections themselves seem to tell a different, and bleaker, story: perhaps a
better title would have been Shaping International Law To Meet the Demands
of Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis. Despite this fact, the book is still an
important contribution to the field, and the oral history format, unprecedented
as it is, makes the book readable and revealing-a cautionary tale for advocates
and believers of the moral force of international law.
The Life of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, QC, FBA, LLD. By Sir Elihu Lauterpacht.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xii, 505. Price:
$180.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by: Shashank P. Kumar.
In The Life of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Hersch Lauterpacht's only child-
a distinguished international lawyer in his own right-weaves together the
story of his father, one of the greatest international lawyers of the twentieth
century. Hersch Lauterpacht's son chronicles his father's variegated
13. Ari Shapiro, U.S. Drone Strikes Are Justified, Legal Adviser Says, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Mar. 26,2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=125206000&ft-1&f-3.
14. Press Release, General Assembly, UN Expert Tells Third Committee No State Free from
Human Rights Violations, Accountability System Must Be Effective: Committee Hears from Human
Rights Council Experts on Education, Extrajudicial Execution, Foreign Debt, as Two-Week Debate
Continues, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/3960 (Oct. 27, 2009).
15. Jack Goldsmith, Presidential War Unilateralism and the Role of a Government Lawyer:




professional life as a prolific teacher, scholar, judge, practitioner, and advocate.
His progressive writing and ideas have had a continuing influence on the
development of international law, particularly with respect to the position of the
individual and role of the judge in the international legal order. As a member of
the International Law Commission and as the Special Rapporteur on the Law of
Treaties, he made foundational contributions to the codification of the law. As a
practitioner, he was involved in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals
following the Second World War. During his tenure as a judge at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a little over five years, he personified his
vision of international judicial function and delivered several landmark
opinions, many of them separate and dissenting, which enriched the early
jurisprudence of the Court and remain relevant today.
Much has been written about Hersch Lauterpacht's life and work, but
these accounts often provide only "fragments for a portrait"l 6 of his
distinguished international legal career. Published in 2010 to coincide with the
fiftieth anniversary of Hersch Lauterpacht's death, Elihu Lauterpacht's
biography of his father tells a much more complete story of Hersch Lauterpacht
in the many realms of his personal and professional life.
The biography draws heavily from previously unpublished
correspondence between Hersch Lauterpacht and his family and colleagues,
carefully collected and preserved by his wife. The resulting narrative, built
around these letters, provides a personal account of Hersch Lauterpacht's life,
defined not merely by his scholarly publications and judicial opinions, but also
through his thoughts and activities.
Although a personal focus pervades the entire narrative, the chapters
describing the life of the Lauterpacht family during the Second World War
(chapters five to seven), reveal his strong character and love for his family.
During the war years, Hersch Lauterpacht divided his time between Cambridge
and the United States, visiting several U.S. law schools while his family
remained in New York. The frequent family correspondence during this period
forms the basis of the narrative. Amid that correspondence, the book also
provides insight into the close relationship between Hersch Lauterpacht and his
son, the biographer, who stayed back in the United States for his education
when Hersch Lauterpacht and his wife returned to Cambridge. The letters
exchanged between them show his deep concern for his son's education and
personal development. The correspondence thus provides a detailed character
sketch of Hersch Lauterpacht the man, and an account of the difficult
conditions that beset the family. They reveal him as "a man of strong will,
determination and the ability to cope with adverse circumstances" (p.133) and
show his undying love and concern for his family.
Hersch Lauterpacht also kept many close friendships and relationships
with colleagues. Perhaps the two most influential and important were his
friendships with Arnold McNair and C.W. Jenks. On the relationship between
16. Stephen M. Schwebel, Hersch Lauterpacht: Fragments for a Portrait, 8 EUR. J. INT'L. L.
305 (1997).
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Hersch Lauterpacht and Lord McNair, the biographer notes: "It is impossible to
overstate the extent and quality of McNair's friendship with Hersch. McNair
was a party to every step in Hersch's career, first at the LSE, then at Cambridge
and ultimately at the ICJ. Hardly a week passed without letters passing between
them" (p.43). His friendship with Jenks, documented through the
"correspondence of two giants of legal literature" (p.8), demonstrate his
"capacity for constructive friendship" (p.8), honesty, and reciprocity.
The unique combination of the biographer's thorough knowledge of
international law and his close filial relationship with Hersch Lauterpacht
enables him to paint a detailed portrait of his father. This, along with his
reliance on Hersch Lauterpacht's correspondence with his family and
colleagues, allows him to coherently interweave the personal with the
professional, contextualizing his work and accomplishments with his beliefs
and motivations.
The book roots Latuerpacht's accomplishments in a historical and
situational context. For example, the seeds of Hersch Lauterpacht's highly
regarded lecturing skills are traced back to lectures on Jewish philosophy and
history that he gave as the chairman of a group of Zionist school students in his
teens. Similarly, his work in assisting the United States by developing legal
arguments supporting qualified neutrality in 1941, his involvement in the
prosecution of war criminals between 1942 and 1946, and his work on the
international protection and enforcement of human rights between 1942 and
1945 are explained as motivated by his concern and distress about the fate of
his Polish family, who were captured by the Germans and eventually murdered.
Early in his prolific professional life, Hersch Lauterpacht's scholarly
writings demonstrated his belief in "international law as a complete legal
system," and his desire "to take international law from its esoteric origins into
an important and influential area of law" (p.64). Hersch Lauterpacht's early
scholarly contributions demonstrate the common thread of his belief that
international legal rules are mere vessels whose content is defined through the
judicial function. Similarly, the biographer notes that Lauterpacht's editorial
work on the Annual Digest and Reports of the Public International Law Cases
(renamed International Law Reports in 1950) and the British Yearbook of
International Law was driven by the belief that "if international jurists were to
be the 'backbone' of an international legal system, they needed the proper tools
with which to perform their essential role" (p.64).
For international lawyers and scholars familiar with the ideas of Hersch
Lauterpacht, such a narrative provides an essential backdrop for studying and
analyzing his work, giving insight into the thought processes and qualities that
made him such a successful international lawyer and scholar. This narrative is
also useful in charting the historical development of international law pedagogy
and practice from the perspective of someone very closely involved in the
process. The chapters covering Hersch Lauterpacht's travels across the United
States and visits to various U.S. law schools, for example, provide a detailed
account of the history of international law pedagogy in the United States during
the Second World War. The exchanges between Hersch Lauterpacht and his
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colleagues expose the conditions under which the "classical traditional law of
nations"' 7 developed. For instance, while covering Lauterpacht's years in
practice and his tenure at the ICJ, chapters nine and eleven give a detailed
picture of the inceptive years of postwar international legal practice.
The biographer presents an accessible and interesting narrative, despite
the depth and range of the professional work portrayed. Such an approach is
particularly beneficial for students and would even be of use to non-lawyers
who are looking for an initial foray into the field of international law. The
chapters detailing Hersch Lauterpacht's years as a practitioner and judge
perhaps best exemplify this accessibility. Without getting lost in the specific
facts and law of the disputes in which Lauterpacht was involved, the biographer
presents a simplified, yet comprehensive, description of the major issues and
the background of each dispute on which Hersch Lauterpacht worked as well as
the institutional practice of the ICJ, where he spent much time working.
Further, as the biographer himself notes, a formidable challenge for a son
writing a biography of his father is "approaching the subject with a sufficient
degree of detachment and objectivity" (p. 5). In discussing the response to the
publication of Hersch Lauterpacht's book The Function of Law in the
International Community (1933), for example, the biographer notes E. H.
Carr's criticism of the work as "utopian idealism" (p.66). While the author
strives for balance, the biography is written as a tribute to Hersch Lauterpacht
that seeks "to do appropriate justice to his memory" (p. 429), and it would be
unreasonable to expect any further objectivity on the biographer's part.
In sum, The Life of Hersch Lauterpacht is an accessible and personal
account of the life of one of the leading international lawyers of the twentieth
century. Apart from defining Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's achievements and
success as a function of his beliefs and motivations, the biography-in part
instructive, in part inspirational-contains much information and wisdom that
will be useful to a range of readers, from seasoned international lawyers,
scholars, and historians to students who are new to international law.
Torture, Terror, and Trade-offs: Philosophy for the White House. By Jeremy
Waldron. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 400. Price:
$37.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Lowry Pressly.
As the tenth anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks approaches,
we stand poised to commemorate the nearly three thousand lives lost in that
horrific act of mass murder, as well as the lives of the more than eight hundred
first responders who died. This will also be a time for reflection on what is
commonly referred to as "the day that everything changed," "the day that
changed America," or "the day that changed the world"-indeed, political
thinking (especially in the arena of national security) is often delineated into
either pre- or post-9/1 1. The image of the watershed moment has become so
17. Ram P. Anand, Attitudes of Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of
International Law, 15 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 55, 63 (1966).
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common in our discourse that its conclusions are taken for granted. This near
universal perception of a major change in American life begs the beguilingly
simple question: what is it that has changed? This is a question not just of
interest to historians and commentators, but-as Jeremy Waldron recognizes in
his new collection of essays, Torture, Terror, and Trade-offs: Philosophy for
the White House-it is a question the answer to which has profound
implications for our Republic.
As a practical matter, little has changed for the average U.S. citizen. To
be sure, the level of fear has skyrocketed (despite the relative statistical
improbability of being the target of a terrorist attack and the governmental
measures aimed at assuaging fears and/or threats to safety), but aside from
longer lines at airports, the average citizen has been asked to sacrifice very little
in the name of enhanced security. As Ronald Dworkin notes, "None of the
administration's [security] decisions will affect more than a tiny number of
American citizens. . . . Most of us pay almost nothing in personal freedom
when such measures are used against those the president suspects of
terrorism."' 8
The importance placed on U.S. national security and the rhetoric
surrounding it have certainly become elevated. The tragedy has become a
political philosopher's stone for a certain class of office-seeker; it (and
especially the fear of repeated atrocities) has been used as justification for
policies ranging from a declaration of war to abduction (rendition) and torture
of suspected terrorists to warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens. Policies that
had long been considered off the table have come back into the realm of
possibility. So perhaps the more important question is: how did our moral
universe morph, if at all, after September 11? It is this question-and the fact
that such a change is taken for granted by so many-that lies at the heart of
Waldron's excellent book.
There is a simple answer to this seemingly fraught question: nothing. The
moral foundations we went to bed with on September 10, 2001 were the same
ones we carried through those initial days of horror and uncertainty, and they
remain unchanged by the exigencies of an indeterminate "War on Terror." This
seems simple enough-that the normative demands of our society's moral
fundaments do not change under the pressure of either the first or the last
incidence of national tragedy-but the sheer magnitude of the 9/11 events
opened up for discussion what had before been forbidden by legal and moral
strictures. Waldron's book centers on the most brutal and invasive of these
changes: the institutionalized use of torture by the United States and the
rhetoric surrounding it both pre- and post-9/1 1.
At the heart of most justifications for the use of torture (and other
measures previously thought beyond the pale) is that, in a post-9/11 world beset
at all times by the very real threat of international terrorism, we "need to
realign balances between security and freedom."' 9 In an excellent essay,
18. Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44, 48.
19. Nicholas Kristoff, Liberal Reality Check: We Must Look Anew at Freedom vs. Security,
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Waldron takes this idea of balancing liberty and security to task. The essay is
noteworthy, among other reasons, for the fact that it was written in 2002, near
the height of national fear and years before stories of Abu Graib, Guantanimo,
and black sites-one is tempted to say it was ahead of its time were the
principles on display not as old as the Republic. Lawyers have long struggled
with the concept of balancing in a number of contexts. As a jurisprudential
practice, the rhetoric of balancing is cover, whether for pragmatism or pretext is
a matter of debate, but few would make any claim to the level of precision that
the term connotes. In the case of security, the idea of balancing can be
dangerous in that it implies not only a ratio between security and liberty (often
not just liberty, but fundamental rights) but also a relationship between the two
such that when political exigencies demand greater security, the effective and
required solution will involve the constriction of liberty. This is, of course, not
the case, and Waldron marshals a number of convincing arguments against this
conception. And, as Dworkin's observation points out, there are serious
distributional concerns involved in trading liberties or rights for security.
Waldron differentiates between instances when all citizens are asked to
sacrifice some liberty in the interest of a concomitant increase in security for all
(intrapersonal tradeoffs) and instances in which the liberty of one group-often
a minority-is sacrificed for the security benefit of another segment of the
populace (interpersonal tradeoffs). It is the later case that is particularly
disfavored in our legal and moral systems, and the danger posed by such
interpersonal rights-trading becomes increasingly instantiated and publicly
defended in the face of a pervasive fear of terrorism. Waldron emphasizes that
this essay was intended as a "call for care and caution," (p. 46) but, years since
that call was ignored, it reads as an indictment of a rhetoric of balancing that
has been dangerously unexamined at best and is morally corrupt and
intentionally misleading at worst.
The discussion of when and where torture can be justified is driven by the
terms of that conversation. Already, by giving the question its most common
framing, I have presumed that torture can be justified. Waldron, thoughtfully
and correctly, gives the lie to this loaded question. The amount of effort
required to wrest the debate back from the presumption of torture's
permissibility is dismaying, but Waldron is more than up to the task. One of the
more prominent names skewing the terms of the debate was and is Harvard
Law School professor Alan Dershowitz. Dershowitz has been in many ways
emblematic of the debate surround torture. For Professor Dershowitz, as
evidenced publications like "When Torture is the Least Evil of Terrible
Options," 20 the alternative to the illegal torture (forgive for a moment the moral
nearsightedness of this phrase) conducted by the United States and its agents
(Egypt, Syria, et al.) is not no torture, but is rather a judicially regulated torture
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 3, 2002, at A9.
20. Alan Dershowitz, When Torture Is the Least Evil of Terrible Options, TIMES HIGHER
EDUC. (June I1, 2004), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=189257
&sectioncode=26; see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT
AGE (2002).
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regime.21 In fact, Dershowitz-and he is not alone-has said that in some
instances one has a moral duty to subject a human to torture. 22 The arguments
against this type of consequentialism are legion and convincing, and Waldron
examines them in depth. What is more interesting, however, is Waldron's
illumination of the shift in the terms of the moral debate over torture.
It strikes Waldron as strange that the permissibility of torture should be
taken for granted by so many in this debate (domestic and international positive
law, widely shared foundational norms and morality, religious proscriptions,
and centuries of moral philosophy notwithstanding, apparently). Indeed, to
maintain a categorical ban on torture, as Waldron does, has come to be seen in
some circles as naivet6; commentators trumpet their heroic honestly, like
Charles Krauthammer who wrote an article simpatico to Dershowitz's position
with the subtitle: It's Time To Be Honest About Doing Terrible Things.2 Not
doing terrible things is not within the realm of possible options (and it is fairly
uncontroversial that torture surpasses simply terrible; as war is terrible,
spaghetti can be terrible).
Waldron traces a large part of this initial assumption back to the idea of
necessity and to the ubiquitous "ticking timebomb" hypothetical. This should
come as no surprise to anyone who has engaged in this debate (especially not to
students of law, government, and political science, as I explain further below).
The story, reliant upon the inevitability and omniscience of programs like Fox's
24, goes like this: there is a nuclear device in New York City set to go off
shortly, and you (or your agent) has a human terrorist in custody who has
information that could prevent the imminent disaster, but the information can
be extracted only though the application of torture. In this case, so the thinking
goes, "[n]ot only is it permissible to hang this miscreant by his thumbs. It is a
moral duty." 24 Painting the victim of torture as a "miscreant" is an ancient
tactic for the legitimization of torture, though any real knowledge of
miscreancy comes post-hoc-otherwise, why would the man be on the rack?
This raises serious moral concerns, which Waldron tackles with aplomb, as
well as the problem of moral luck for interrogators (who, as we have seen, will
undoubtedly take the fall if the bomb turns out to be a mirage and/or the torture
victim was innocent).
These ticking timebomb scenarios have been debunked by a panoply of
writers for a number of reasons, though even deontological opponents of torture
sometimes allow for an escape valve to prevent a major moral catastrophe.
Waldron, however, will not have it. For once one allows for torture in cases of
so-called "necessity" (that term itself being impossible in the real world
analogs to these hypotheticals), then all that is left is to haggle about is the
21. Dershowitz proposes a regime of torture warrants but somehow assumes that the judiciary
will be an effective bulwark against "unjustified" torture. This ignores a number of realities, including
the current culture of pro forma warrant approval and the dangerous circularity of probable cause.
22. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 20, at 470-77.
23. Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture: It's Time To Be Honest About Doing





price. "Should it worry us," asks Waldron, "that once one goes down this road,
the justification of torture-indeed the justification of anything-is a matter of
simple arithmetic coupled with the professor's concocting the appropriate fact
situation?" (p. 218). Is torture-the practice that had been declared an
unequivocally impermissible malum in se by international and domestic law-
really just a matter of utilitarian calculation? And if so, where does one draw
the line? Rape warrants? The torture of family members? When moral
deliberation is recast as arithmetic, the unthinkable becomes permissible
(indeed, perhaps necessary, as Professor Dershowitz and others have said-
under the arithmetic formulation, might we be compelled to torture or even kill
ninety-nine humans to save a hundred?).
To be sure, a line must be drawn somewhere, and Waldron draws that line
at torture, not out of simplicity, cowardice, or nalvet6, but out of earnest
engagement with the moral issues. "We can all be persuaded," he writes, "to
draw the line somewhere, and I say we should draw it where the law requires it,
and where human rights tradition has insisted it should be drawn" (p. 219).
There must, after all, be something worth protecting.
Something indeed has changed since September 11, 2001. Before that
day, it would have seemed fairly uncontroversial that the line should be drawn
where the law requires it. In the years following the attacks, however,
intelligent, thoughtful lawyers labored to prove otherwise. Lawyers like John
Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Alan Dershowitz are now well known (if not infamous)
for their support (and in some cases creation) of the Bush Administration's
policies on torture, extraordinary rendition, and the like. The issue has moved
from a world all too familiar with the motivations behind Common Article 3 to
one where, at least in the United States, the question is not "if' to torture but
"when" and "how far," and the question of necessity is not epiphenomenal. 25
Waldron writes:
But in any case, one's answer [to the necessity hypothetical] is less important
than one's estimation of the question. An affirmative answer is meant to make
us feel patriotic and tough minded. But the question that is supposed to elicit
this response is at best silly and at worst deeply corrupt. It is silly because
torture is seldom used in the real world to elicit startling facts about particular
bombs [but rather is used to glean lots of small and relatively insignificant
pieces of information]. And it is corrupt because it attempts to use a far-fetched
scenario, more at home in a television thriller than in the real world,
deliberately to undermine the integrity of moral positions. (p. 219)
This last point is of critical importance. In the minds of many Americans-
from policymakers to educators to the lay citizenry-the cruelty of torture, that
ultimate evil in a liberal society, has been supplanted by a chimerical necessity.
To put it another way, the ticking bomb scenario, which David Luban timely
26decried as intellectual fraud, changes the terms of the debate. Torture
25. It seems we-and by "we" I mean principally the United States, but the wider world as
well-missed an educational opportunity early on by framing the issue as a technical matter rather than
engaging in a serious discussion on the morality-the rightness and wrongness-of inflicting pain, of
brutality and killing.
26. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425
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becomes interrogation, and the calculation shifts from the certainty of torture
against a possibility of useful information to the pain of the guilty verses the
lives of the innocents. Though it certainly is true that torture probably harms
our foreign policy interests politically, Waldron urges us-as citizens-not to
ignore the domestic moral cost of assenting to the torture of human beings at
the hands of our agents.
It is evident, even from the dedication page that Waldron fully grasps the
importance of this debate. These are not mere intellectual exercises or cultural
criticism confined to the ivory tower of philosophy departments and law
schools. Indeed, torture as we have come to know it in the years since 9/11 has
not been the aberrant work of a few bad actors; it was institutionalized,
promulgated from the highest levels of government by generally well-educated
and thoughtful policymakers. Torture, Terror, and Trade-offs reminds us of
how important moral philosophy is to our polity, and how truly vital it is that it
be taught in our schools-universities, law schools, and medical schools, as
they are all implicated in these recent failings. Jeremy Waldron continues to
remind us that moral deliberation and taking principles seriously must be
fundamental to our society if it is to be worth protecting.
Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and
Economic Development Around the World. By Curtis Milhaupt &
Katharina Pistor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008. Pp. ix,
224. Price: $39.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Dave Ryan.
What role does law play in helping countries to achieve economic
growth? The prevailing view among scholars of law and economics is that law
is a prerequisite for growth because it provides protection of property rights.
People will not invent, buy, or sell if their products or profits can be taken
without recourse. Strong protective legal systems provide the foundation for
building a market economy. If a country does not have such a system, it should
acquire it. This view has been implemented throughout the world over the past
half-century, influenced by American economic ideology and institutions.
Policymakers have transported the legal systems credited with supporting
sustained economic growth in the United States and the European Union to a
range of countries including Japan after World War II, Eastern Europe after the
fall of the Soviet Union, and, now, much of the developing world.
In Law and Capitalism, Columbia Law School Professors Curtis
Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor draw from their expertise in comparative and
corporate law to offer a fundamental and consequential rebuke to this simplistic
view of how law affects economic growth. Legal systems, they argue, do not
solely protect rights, nor are they fixed foundations. On the contrary, legal
systems can also serve a "coordinative" function and adapt in a "rolling
relationship" with markets over time (p. 6). Under coordinative legal systems, a




ongoing role in the economy, using law to direct rights and resources to
different actors to implement policy goals.
One such country is post-Soviet Russia. The 1993 Russian constitution
created "a strong presidency with extensive decree powers" that allowed
President Boris Yeltsin to play a significant role in coordinating the massive
wave of privatizations after the fall of the Soviet Union (p. 163). Yeltsin's
officials did not draft clear, protective laws to facilitate a free-market bidding
process for ownership of the privatizing enterprises. Instead, they drafted laws
that were "intentionally ambiguous," and designed "to ensure a predetermined
outcome . . . deter foreign investors . . . and to give bureaucrats in the
privatization agency enough discretion to prevent competing bids" (p. 158).
Less than a decade later, when Yeltsin and then his successor Vladimir
Putin sought to re-nationalize major companies, they again used law not to
protect property rights but to coordinate resources and actors. They directed
state tax and bankruptcy agencies to bring companies to bankruptcy, and then
facilitated bidding processes designed to transfer ownership back to the state.
Putin followed this strategy to re-nationalize Yukos, a major Russian oil
company. First, his officials levied "highly dubious" claims of tax liability
against the company, charging it with tax bills in 2001 and 2002 that exceeded
its entire revenue from those years (p. 158). Then, the government froze the
company's assets, declared it bankrupt, and broke it up, auctioning its assets to
various state owned companies (p. 159). Yeltsin and Putin frequently employed
tax and bankruptcy law to coordinate resources in the market from 1998 to
2002, during which time "more than 50 percent of all bankruptcy cases each
year were brought by the state" (p. 158-59).
Conversely, in "protective law" countries like the United States, laws are
made, changed, and enforced through a decentralized process involving a range
of private actors, including shareholders, attorneys, and lobbyists, who seek
protection of their property rights under the law. The American legal response
to the Enron scandal, for example, provides a stark contrast to the Yukos story
in Russia. When Enron filed for bankruptcy following years of accounting
fraud and false earning reports, the legal response was driven not by
government agencies but by "a highly complex and decentralized system of
corporate and securities law enforcement, with many of the most powerful tools
in the hands of private investors (and their lawyers)" (p. 53). According to
Milhaupt and Pistor, the United States "is an outlier in the extent to which it
provides legal rights and enforcement mechanisms to shareholders" to allow
them to protect their investments (p. 52). These legal rights led to a "blizzard of
legal responses" by private investors and creditors to the collapse of Enron (p.
185).
The distinction between coordinative-centralized legal systems and
protective-decentralized systems is also helpful for understanding the recent
experiences of China and Singapore. In these countries, central governments
play large roles in coordinating markets, in contrast to the American system in
which private actors take action to enforce rules and protect rights. Indeed the
legal response to the Enron case in the U.S. contrasts not only with the Yukos
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case in Russia, but with the coordinated, centralized responses to corporate
crises in China, Singapore, Japan, and Germany. Investors in Japan and
Germany, for example, do not share the private rights of action under securities
laws that investors enjoy in U.S. courts. In both Japan and Germany, the
protection of private rights is subordinated to the "existing governmental
enforcement apparatus" (p. 185).
Both protective and coordinative systems illustrate the second aspect of
the thesis of Law and Capitalism: that laws exist not as a fixed entity, like a
piece of technology, but as a force that must consistently adapt to meet
changing market needs. Milhaupt and Pistor recognize that legal change has
been addressed in the literature on law and capitalism, but argue that even when
it is addressed, "the answer, often implicit, is that legal change is an
evolutionary process" through which legal systems "arrive at a comparable
menu of strategies to address the common functional needs of market actors"
(p. 197-8). This view, they argue, fails to account for the need for law to
respond to continuously changing market conditions.
The two aspects of Milhaupt and Pistor's thesis-that law can be either
protective-decentralized or coordinative-centralized, and that law is not fixed,
but always evolving to meet changing market needs--come together to create
wide-ranging implications and pose fascinating questions. The authors
recognize two audiences for whom their thesis will be particularly relevant:
scholars of the interaction between law and markets, and policymakers
interested in using legal reforms to enhance economic growth.
To scholars seeking to understand the relationship between law and
markets, the thesis proposes a new framework for comparing and
understanding legal systems. The framework suggests that future studies should
shift their focus away from the origins of legal systems and away from efforts
to identify a single set of characteristics for effective legal systems. Instead,
they argue, scholars should focus on how systems differ in function and form
and how they change over time. Milhaupt and Pistor intentionally steer clear of
empirical research. Instead, they devote the majority of the book to applying
the framework to a narrow set of case studies of corporate governance crises in
large economies in the past thirty years. The authors themselves acknowledge
the limitations of this approach, but respond that such "out-of-equilibrium
events" expose true elements of a system that may have been "beneath the
radar when it was functioning smoothly" (p. 11). In fact the case studies do
provide vivid and detailed illustrations of the authors' framework, as well as
interesting and in-depth descriptions of major events.
Such massive corporate crises, though, are unique in the public attention
and political implications they create. The resulting legal reforms may be
driven less by what the authors characterize as a healthy "iterative" process
between law and markets (pg. 6), and more by a rushed and potentially short-
sighted political incentive to take strong and visible public action. Further, the
authors' solitary focus on corporate governance law does not shine light on the
function and organization of law in countless other critical areas where law
interacts with market economies, including banking law, property law, and
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intellectual property law. Finally, the case studies do not provide context to
analyze trends across the globe. The reader is left wondering whether legal
change operates substantially differently in response to market needs that
happen out of the public eye. Does the framework apply outside of corporate
governance law? What percentage of legal systems around the world would be
categorized as protective-decentralized or coordinative-centralized? Do more
developed or developing countries fall on one side or the other? Are China and
Singapore exceptions, or do they truly show an alternative method for using
law to promote economic growth? Do countries generally become more
protective as they grow and develop, or more coordinative, or neither? That
these questions remain unanswered reflects not the failure but the success of
this book, which acknowledges early on its goal of provoking further questions
in line with the framework it introduces.
Even with these significant questions left unanswered, Milhaupt and
Pistor's thesis provides a useful framework for policymakers pursuing legal
reforms in the developing world. First, if either protective-decentralized or
coordinative-centralized legal systems can support economic growth, then the
developing world should not solely import or adopt systems from one end of
that spectrum. Indeed the authors argue that, while "well intentioned, the
intense focus on U.S. legal approaches may lead to a poverty of imagination in
seeking solutions to other countries' governance problems" (p. 222). Additional
solutions may be found in countries with more coordinative and centralized
legal systems underpinning economic growth such as Germany, Japan, and
Korea.
Further, the thesis provides a nuanced view of the prospects and
challenges for any "legal transplants" from developed to developing countries.
Given the need for law to consistently adapt to meet changing market needs
over time, imported legal systems will face inherent challenges, because
importing governments must demand and actively accept it enough to integrate,
enforce, and adapt it (p. 210). When is this challenge most likely to be
overcome? According to Milhaupt and Pistor, legal transplants are more likely
to be successful when incoming laws have the same dominant function
(protective or coordinative) and organization (centralized or decentralized) as
the existing system in that country (p. 210).
Despite these clear policy implications, Law and Capitalism does not
purport to be a guide for development officials, and contains no roadmap for
successful legal reforms for development. The case studies all focus on the
function, structure, and dynamics of law in developed countries. The case
studies show how law can support developed economies through multiple
functions and forms. They do not necessarily show that law can interact with
markets in the same ways in developing countries. Challenges to market
economies and legal enforcement and the role of legal institutions are very
different in developing countries than in the much larger and more advanced
economies of developed countries.
To become more directly relevant to policymakers, the framework should
be extended to historical analyses of today's developed countries during their
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earlier periods of development, and to today's developing countries.
Developing countries today face different circumstances than developing
countries did a century ago. Many developing countries today seek to
accelerate growth through international trade and demand effective legal
systems that will facilitate their integration into global markets. Do
coordinative or protective legal systems facilitate global integration, and
encourage foreign investment, more effectively? To what extent will legal
harmonization with key trading partners or strategic allies facilitate outward
focused economic growth?
The strength of Law and Capitalism is not its comprehensive scope or
quantifiable results. In fact the authors profess "dissatisfaction" with the
"tendency to place great analytical weight on quantifiable but extremely thin
legal variables" (p. 10). The strength of this book is the insightful and
provocative analytical framework it offers for rethinking how law interacts with
and supports markets. The well-known and dramatic case studies provide
accessible and informative illustrations of the framework. The detailed stories
and observations distract somewhat from the clarity and utility of the case
studies in developing the framework but make for fascinating tales that keep
the reader engaged. In the final chapters, Milhaupt and Pistor synthesize the
lessons from the case studies and compare and contrast the different legal
systems highlighted in the cases. By its end, the book achieves the worthwhile
goal it sets out in its introductory pages: to raise an important and novel line of
questions for those seeking to understand the relationship between law and
economic development.
Networks and States: The Global Politics ofInternet Governance. By Milton L.
Mueller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. Pp. 313. Price: $35.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Paul Slattery.
Milton L. Mueller's Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet
Governance evaluates international disputes over who should provide which
forms of Internet governance. Mueller, a professor of information studies at
Syracuse University, uses the term "Internet governance" to refer to everything
from the regulation of intellectual property and cybercrime to the management
of routing and domain names. He situates his argument between the two poles
that have dominated Internet governance debates thus far. Mueller rejects the
"cyberlibertarian" view that communications technology inherently creates
freedom, thrives without any regulation, and is rendering traditional states
obsolete (p. 3). He also rejects the "cyberconservative" view that states can
approach Internet governance as a run-of-the-mill policy problem easily
addressed with domestic and intergovernmental law (p. 3). Instead, Mueller
argues that the openness, transnationalism, and networking that characterize the
Internet are driving institutional innovation in Internet governance and
challenging states' ability to control their communications policy by traditional
means. Mueller focuses this descriptive argument on Internet governance
debates surrounding intellectual property, national security, Internet resource
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management, and content regulation.
As a normative matter, Mueller argues that we must embrace the
"Internet's early promise of unfettered and borderless communication" (p. 5).
We must also recognize, however, that some regulation is inevitable and work
to protect the Internet's emancipatory power as Internet governance matures.
The key, Mueller feels, is to avoid hierarchal regulatory systems based
exclusively on states or intergovernmental bodies, which will stifle innovation
and political freedom on the web. Mueller's alternative is "networked
governance," a system in which states, businesses, nonprofits, and civil society
cooperate to manage the Internet. (p. 6). Networked governance is meant to
mirror the elements that have made the Internet successful. First, it emphasizes
"multistakeholderism"-the inclusive participation of all interested parties (p.
7). Second, it utilizes "peer production"-the aggregation of many independent
individuals' contributions, as exemplified by Wikipedia and cybercrime
hotlines (p. 7). In the final pages of his book, Mueller suggests that "true"
cyberlibertarianism, a more nuanced version of contemporary libertarian
approaches to the web, should guide Internet governance (p. 268). This
philosophy would embrace a "universal right to receive and impart information
regardless of frontiers" and "prevent states from ensnaring global
communications in interstate rivalries and politico-military games" (p. 269).
Mueller offers an excellent descriptive framework and body of
background material on Internet governance. It is accessible without technical
knowledge and efficiently summarizes the secondary literature. It also does not
presume familiarity with slightly obscure policy debates and institutional
history, and it is sufficiently comprehensive to be an introduction for
professionals or the first book in a communications law seminar. The book is
particularly valuable as a historical introduction to the institutions and debates
that have dominated Internet governance thus far-the U.N.'s World Summit
on the Information Society, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (the American nonprofit that largely controls domain names), and the
parties and interests that have shaped both. The book is imminently readable,
though the necessary and necessarily dry background on the evolution of
intergovernmental institutions and network theory requires some resolve from
readers.
Though the book shines in the descriptive sections, its normative
arguments feel incomplete. Mueller's analysis of the conflicts in Internet
governance, how they pressure governments, and how governments might react
to inhibit the Internet's development are persuasive, but his prescriptive
arguments suffer from two main weaknesses. First, he treats his "networked
governance" and "true" version of cyberlibertarianism a bit like magic bullets.
They make conceptual sense when read with his criticisms of modem Internet
governance debates, but a reader would have difficulty figuring out how to
apply them to specific cases. Granted, Internet governance presents a multitude
of apparently disparate policy issues, and developing a practical and unified
regulatory approach would be challenging. However, networked governance
and cyberlibertarianism are vague and largely defined in the negative, which
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makes them feel like malleable foils for Mueller's criticisms of the status quo.
Second, Mueller thoroughly explores the Internet's promise and its
vulnerability to unthinking or politically motivated regulation, but he analyzes
states and their interests vis-A-vis the Internet very little. Mueller dismisses the
idea that the Internet is rendering states obsolete, and he dismisses the idea that
states may approach Internet governance like any other policy issue. However,
his preferred approach-networked governance-is largely about protecting
the Internet from what states would do if given free reign to regulate. The book
thus provides little insight into the policy space in which states are operating
and what their interests might be. One gets the sense that China, more than any
other nation, provides the lurking content behind the term "state." States are
presumed to be interested in blocking political content, tracking criminals and
others alike, and leveraging control of the Internet for geopolitical power.
Indeed, Mueller takes a dim view of any state or intergovernmental intrusion
into Internet governance, which may explain why networked governance
emphasizes the participation of nonprofits and civil society at the expense of
exclusive state power.
A comprehensive theory of state interests in the Internet would be beyond
the scope of Mueller's book, but it would be useful to analyze how the Internet
has changed the environment in which states operate, in addition to how states
might change the Internet. China, with its somewhat successful efforts to edit
and territorialize the Internet, is fairly unique, and it is not clear that its model
is sustainable. If a more comprehensive view is taken, there are a number of
ways in which the Internet changes the game for states.
As Mueller notes, the Internet collects a previously unthinkable amount
of information from many disparate sources and transports it across national
borders, but Mueller does not address the challenges for states trying to resist
this free flow of information. Outright rejection of connectivity by a state is
enormously costly. The Internet offers more efficient communication, more
appeal to foreign direct investors, and a shot at increased entrepreneurship
through online education and online marketing of domestic products. In sum,
divorcing these benefits from the transmission of political speech and sensitive
information poses at least four challenges that counsel a more optimistic view
of the Internet's resilience in the face of state regulation.
First, filtering the Internet is technically difficult and risks the exit of
major service providers. For countries with smaller markets, developing the
expertise and infrastructure to censor information from many redundant
international sources is likely to prove both costly and futile, and the risk that
irreplaceable multinational service providers will exit rather than endure the
costs of tailoring services to domestic regulation is real. Even in larger markets,
filtering is a difficult task. The discord between Chinese regulators and Google
over censorship of Google search results generated service interruptions and
posturing by both the U.S. and Chinese governments. 2 7 However, the impact on
27. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State Remarks at the Newseum in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
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the information available to Chinese citizens may prove minimal. To date,
while Google has ceased redirecting all traffic to its less-filtered Hong Kong
site, it now provides a link to the site on its Chinese search page. Moreover, an
information containment strategy that conceals politically controversial
knowledge most of the time is a bit like a nuclear nonproliferation strategy that
conceals the details of how to build a bomb most of the time. An explosive fact
need only get through once to defeat the entire strategy.
Second, anticipating the pathways and forms of information that pose a
threat to an established order is not easy. One of the most striking aspects of the
Internet age has been the variety of unanticipated uses users find for a
fundamental technology once it is released. The easiest example is the Internet
itself, though the phenomenon is reflected in everything from the open-source
movement to the use of Google Earth to crowd-source 3D building models. The
fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, as well as recent political unrest in other
Middle Eastern countries, illustrate the difficulty this innovation and adaptation
poses for censors. The case is easily overstated, but it is suggestive that a public
affinity for Twitter could prove to be a crucial source of information for
multinational media and an organizational tool for revolutionaries. Mueller is
concerned about the failures of imagination native to government
bureaucracies, but where "tweeting" proves a substantial threat to state security,
these deficiencies may protect the emancipatory power of the Internet.
Third, even if states generally want to censor political content on the
Internet, it is not clear that they will cooperate to do so, and even one defecting
state can often thwart such joint censorship efforts. The WikiLeaks saga
illustrates the extent to which divergences of law and opinion across states may
create space for radical organizations. WikiLeaks hosting, for example, has
been a forum-shopping odyssey. The group's central servers remain in Sweden,
though it has switched service providers and also received hosting at various
times from Amazon, French web company OVH, and the Swedish Pirate
Party.2 8 Efforts to cut off WikiLeak's donations have led to similar forum
shopping, as its accounts have been suspended, reinstated, and reconfigured by
many companies in many countries. In short, disagreements between
governments, multinational corporations, and intergovernmental groups may
facilitate emancipatory projects on the Internet, particularly if groups like
WikiLeaks take advantage of the free speech and asylum commitments of
countries like Sweden, Iceland, and Switzerland.
Finally, the free flow of information on the Internet and projects like
WikiLeaks are not without support from powerful traditional interests. The
most obvious example would be a state with a vested stake in controversial
information getting out. Leaking classified information about, for example,
U.S. military interventions may be quite popular with various domestic publics,
and it may be even more so with states concerned about U.S. meddling in
28. Raphael G. Satter and Peter Svensson, WikiLeaks Fights To Stay Online Amid Attacks,
Bus. WK. (Dec. 3, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9JSHKUGO.htm.
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domestic affairs or simply looking for a diplomatic leg up. Google's clash with
China has certainly illustrated the currency that the free flow of information
may have in diplomatic relations. Moreover, states are not the only powerful
interest that may provide support, shelter, or advocacy for radical online
projects. Ideological groups including Public Citizen, the ACLU, the Project on
Government Oversight, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have provided
WikiLeaks free legal support. Perhaps more significantly, WikiLeaks has
received donations from The Associated Press, The Los Angeles Times, and the
National Newspaper Publishers Association, and it has received awards from
The Economist, Amnesty International, and Time Magazine. One gets the sense
from Mueller's book that the Internet is a coalition of the little guys vulnerable
to attacks by traditional powerful interests, but the free flow of information on
the web appears to have some established allies with money and influence.
In sum, Mueller provides an accessible and thorough background and
framework for discussing Internet governance debates. Mueller's prescriptive
arguments leave readers with more questions than answers, but that difficulty
may be inherent in writing about the broad range of issues that fall under the
Internet governance heading. Regardless, while domestic regulation and
intergovernmental posturing may be anathema to the openness and innovation
that have marked the culture of Internet pioneers, advocates for the free flow of
information on the web will need to be strategic in their approach to states and
state interests. As regulation inevitably develops, a well-developed
understanding of the interests of governments and intergovernmental bodies
with regard to the Internet may be a crucial tool in protecting the emancipatory
potential of the web.
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